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Abstract
This paper analyzes the eﬀects of parliamentary election cycles on the Turkish
banking system. Using annual bank-level data representing all banks in Turkey
during 1963–2005, we present evidence of meaningful diﬀerences in the structure
of bank assets, liabilities and ﬁnancial performance across diﬀerent stages of the
parliamentary election cycle. However, we ﬁnd that government-owned banks’ be-
havior does not diﬀer from either domestic and foreign-owned private sector banks
before, during or after elections. Our estimates also show that government-owned
banks underperform their domestic and foreign-owned private sector counterparts.
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11 Introduction
Despite the observation that the role of commercial banks in market-oriented economies
is shrinking, it is an undeniable fact that they retain a pivotal role in ﬁnancial markets.
However, when we investigate the structure of banking systems across diﬀerent coun-
tries, we ﬁnd substantial diﬀerences. For instance, in pure market-oriented economies
such as the US and the UK, governments have traditionally only played a regulatory role
in the banking sector,1 while in many other countries governments directly control ﬁ-
nancial resources through ownership of one or more banks in addition to their regulatory
functions.2 Nations that contain government-owned or state banks base the existence of
such institutions on the ability of state-owned banks to ﬁnance projects that would not
pass scrutiny at private-sector banks. This reasoning is quite controversial as it harbors
the seeds of corruption and ineﬃciency. For instance, state-owned banks can be mis-
used by the governing party, who may direct state banks to channel funds to projects
which will beneﬁt those who support the government rather than those which serve the
greater public interest. In that sense, actions of state-owned banks in ﬁnancial markets
are scrutinized very closely by the public and by international organizations such as the
IMF and the World Bank. Not surprisingly, given those potential controversies embed-
ded in a mixed ﬁnancial system in which private-sector and state-owned banks coexist,
researchers are keen to document the behavioral diﬀerences between state-owned and
private-sector banks.
There is a rapidly developing literature that investigates the beneﬁts and costs of
state-owned banks in ﬁnancial markets. The questions that researchers investigate
vary from the signiﬁcance of bank ownership in the promotion of economic growth
to politicians’ ability to inﬂuence election results through state banks’ actions. At the
heart of the matter, researchers are interested in ﬁnding whether state banks fulﬁll their
functions eﬃciently and eﬀectively or if they promote abuse and economic ineﬃciency
through misallocation of capital.
1The de facto nationalization of US and UK banks in the 2008 ﬁnancial crisis stands in sharp contrast
to those nations’ historical behavior.
2For instance, 32% of Turkish banking assets were controlled by the state in 2005. A similar pattern
is observed in Russia, where the state held 40.7% of bank assets in 2006 Vernikov (2007).
21.1 Brief literature review
Recent research points out that state-owned banks in developing countries seem to have
lower proﬁtability and higher costs. La Porta et al. (2002) and Barth et al. (2000)
provide evidence that state banks are associated with lower economic growth. Yet an
earlier study which uses a sample of European banks during 1986–1989 by Molyneux
and Thornton (1992) ﬁnds that government ownership has a positive impact on bank
proﬁtability. A subsequent study by Micco et al. (2007) points out that the perfor-
mance of state owned banks worsens during election years as it is driven by political
concerns. Din¸ c (2005) investigates the eﬀects of politicians’ inﬂuence on state-owned
banks, concentrating on bank lending behavior. Using a large cross-country dataset, he
ﬁnds evidence that state-owned banks increase their lending in election years relative
to private sector banks. In a similar vein, Brown and Din¸ c (2005) show that prior to
elections failing banks are less likely to be taken into administration. Similarly, Bongini
et al. (2002) suggest that political connections may determine governments’ intervention
to rescue failing banks.
Studies that concentrate on country-speciﬁc data on the behavior of lenders and
borrowers also reveal that ﬁrms that have political ties with politicians are favored
by state-owned banks. Fraser et al. (2006) suggest that Malaysian banks’ leverage is
aﬀected by the share of government ownership, informal ties to politicians, and the own-
ership share held by “institutional investors”, de facto controlled by the government or
government-sponsored agencies. Baum et al. (2008) ﬁnd that politically aﬃliated banks
in Ukraine have signiﬁcantly lower interest rate margins and that the level of activity
of aﬃliated deputies in parliament has a positive impact on linked banks’ capitalization
ratios. Using data from Pakistan, Khwaja and Mian (2005) provide evidence that low-
quality borrowers with political connections borrow from state banks. Cole (2009), using
data from India, shows that state bank credit is 5–10% higher in election years and even
more so in heavily contested electoral districts. He also indicates that state bank loans
are less likely to be repaid. Sapienza (2004) shows the eﬀect of political connections on
state-owned banks in Italy. Concentrating on Italian ﬁrms, he provides evidence that
3state-owned banks charge lower interest rates than do private sector banks. He also
shows that ﬁrms pay lower rates in areas where the head of the local state-owned bank
has the same party aﬃliation as the ruling political party.
1.2 Overview of the paper
In this paper, we study the behavior of private sector and state-owned banks in Turkey
throughout parliamentary election cycles. Our dataset covers the period between 1963
and 2005, during which Turkey conducted 10 parliamentary elections. Our sample
consists of about 2,080 bank-year observations pertaining to 86 banks over a 40 year
period. It should be be noted that since the establishment of the republic in the 1920s,
Turkish ﬁnancial markets beneﬁted from state-owned banks as well as domestic and
foreign private-sector banks. Hence, the data, collected and made available by the Banks
Association of Turkey, are rich and consistent throughout the period of interest. We
carry out our empirical analysis using the system dynamic panel data (DPD) estimator
which combines equations in diﬀerences of the variables with equations in levels of the
variables (see Blundell and Bond (1998)).
Our study diﬀers from the earlier literature on several dimensions. First, our study
provides a thorough investigation of all types of banks in Turkey over election cycles
rather than a knife-edge comparison of banks’ behavior between election versus non-
election years. Next, we also concentrate on the behavior of a number of bank ﬁnance
ratios, their growth rates and performance measures rather than a single factor. Finally,
by concentrating on a single country’s entire banking sector, we scrutinize a consistent
dataset which is not prone to sample selection bias or accounting problems that might
have aﬀected the results presented in earlier research.
Several ﬁndings emerge in a setting where confounding factors are taken into ac-
count within the framework of a dynamic model. We can summarize our results as
follows. Election cycles signiﬁcantly aﬀect bank behavior, but these eﬀects do not diﬀer
meaningfully across state, domestic and foreign-owned private sector banks. In partic-
ular, there is no evidence that state-owned banks increase their lending in comparison
to other bank categories during, before or after elections. This is an interesting ﬁnd-
4ing and diﬀers from the earlier research that has used cross-country or country-speciﬁc
data which points out that state-owned banks behave diﬀerently during election years.
Furthermore, our regression results also show that election cycles do not lead to a dif-
ferential impact on other key ﬁnancial ratios across banks. The second set of results, in
line with earlier research, indicate that state banks are less eﬃcient in comparison to
both domestic and foreign owned private-sector banks.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In the next section we describe
parliamentary elections in Turkey followed by a short summary of developments in
Turkish banking sector. Section 3 presents the data. Section 4 lays out the econometric
model and estimation results. Finally, Section 5 concludes.
2 Parliamentary Elections and Banking in Turkey
Prior to discussing the empirical model and results, it is useful to provide some infor-
mation about the parliamentary system and the banking system in Turkey. In the next
two subsections, we ﬁrst discuss the parliamentary system in Turkey and then present
some information on the banking sector.
2.1 Parliamentary Elections in Turkey
The Turkish Republic is a secular, democratic and pluralistic parliamentary system.
The unicameral Grand National Assembly is elected by popular vote and the country
is governed by the Council of Ministers headed by the Prime Minister. Members of the
Grand National Assembly are elected for a certain period of time, and may be reelected.
Over the period of our investigation, 10 national parliamentary elections took place
in Turkey, in the years 1965, 1969, 1973, 1977, 1983, 1987, 1991, 1995, 2000 and 2002.
In 1980, the Turkish parliamentary system experienced a military intervention. The in-
tervention was in response to an unstable political situation that the elected government
and the Grand National Assembly seemed powerless to remedy. The military leaders
declared that their intention is to restore public order and to prepare the country for
a transition to a functioning democratic system which would avoid the impasses expe-
rienced in prior years. The next parliamentary elections took place in 1983, prior to
5which all pre-1980 parties were abolished and a two-party system was envisioned. Dur-
ing the campaign, the pre-1980 leaders were deprived of their political rights and some
of the newly-formed parties were denied access to the ballot. When civilian control was
restored with the 1983 elections, the pre-1980 parties gradually reemerged to replace
those somewhat artiﬁcial parties which had been established under military rule, as
some older parties dissolved into oblivion.
Prior to the 1983 elections, members of the National Assembly were elected for a
four-year term through universal suﬀrage. Since 1983, members are elected for a ﬁve-
year term, but Parliament may determine the timing of elections. Over the period
of our study, parliamentary elections took place every other four years except for the
last two terms. Unlike a number of other parliamentary democracies, by-elections in the
Turkish system are not common as the criteria to hold a by-election are quite restricted.
To call for by-elections, at least 5% (or 28) of the 550 seats of the National Assembly
must be empty. Furthermore, by-elections cannot take place in the two years following
a parliamentary election, or within the year before a general election.3
2.2 The Banking Sector in Turkey
The ﬁnancial sector in Turkey is traditionally dominated by banking activities. The
Central Bank of Turkey, founded in the early 1930s, regulates and supervises the banking
system while carrying out other responsibilities such as the issuance of banknotes and
protecting the value of the currency. The Central Bank also ﬁnances the government’s
budget deﬁcits and makes loans to public and private banks.
Banking activities have been carried out both by state-owned banks and private-
sector banks since the early years of the republic. Most of the private-sector banks
are locally owned; some are foreign owned while a few are jointly owned by domestic
and foreign banks. Although the state banks’ numbers declined due to mergers or
acquisitions following the ﬁnancial liberalization programme of the 1980s, those that
are in operation today have a very prominent role in the functioning of the ﬁnancial
3See Turan (2003) and the references therein for more information on the Turkish parliamentary
system.
6markets. To avoid speculative motivations, banks operating in Turkey are not allowed
to engage in trading of goods or real estate for commercial purposes.
The major domestically owned private banks are closely linked to industrial groups.
For instance, Yapı ve Kredi Bankası, Pamukbank, and Interbank are owned by the
C ¸ukurova Group conglomerate. Akbank, the most proﬁtable private bank in Turkey,
is owned by the Sabancı Group, one of the largest conglomerates. Partially publicly
traded Ko¸ cbank is owned by another powerful group, Ko¸ c Holding Company.4 The
number of foreign-owned private sector banks increased substantially after the country
went through a programme of ﬁnancial liberalization in the early 1980s (Figure 1).
Currently, banks from various countries including the US, UK, Netherlands, Germany,
and Greece operate in Turkey.5 Also, during this period, several joint ventures were
created, and two Islamic banks started trading in the ﬁnancial markets. As foreign
banks increased their share in Turkish ﬁnancial markets, they brought in new concepts
and ﬁnancial practices and help raise the country’s banking standards. Overall, the
entrance of foreign banks into the Turkish banking system is perceived by bankers and
investors throughout the world as a reﬂection of the progressive internationalization of
Turkey’s ﬁnancial system.
When we investigate the state of the ﬁnancial markets throughout the period of in-
terest, we see that capital markets were highly underdeveloped in the 1960s and 1970s.
Financial markets only began to thrive after the implementation of the ﬁnancial liber-
alization and restructuring programme that started in the 1980s. In this period, ﬁerce
competition amongst banks led to closure of some banks while the total number of banks
increased. Interest rates and exchange rates were freed and new banking and capital
market laws were introduced. Furthermore, all restrictions on foreign exchange trad-
ing and capital movement were removed. During this period, the ¨ Ozal administration
took steps to revive Istanbul’s stock market, which had closed down in the late 1970s.
The Istanbul Stock Exchange (ISE) reopened in December 1985. Trading on the ISE
4Yapı ve Kredi Bankası and Ko¸ cbank merged in 2008.
5It is interesting to note that despite the disputes between Greece and Turkey over sovereignty in
the Aegean Sea or Cyprus, there is no objection to a Greek-owned bank oﬀering ﬁnancial services in
Turkey.
7expanded rapidly in the early 1990s and it became one of the best performing emerging
markets among its peers. Not surprisingly, during this period we observe the emergence
and collapse of many brokerage houses. The restructuring of the Turkish economy in
the 1980’s led to legislative changes and strengthened the Central Bank’s role in super-
vising the markets. Following this period, capital inﬂows began to rise continuously,
and the ﬁnancial system became increasingly linked with external markets.6
3 Data description
Our dataset contains detailed information on all Turkish banks’ balance sheets as pub-
lished on the Banks Association of Turkey website.7 The original data set has 2,242
observations from 1961 to 2005. In order to alleviate the inﬂuence of extreme observa-
tions, bank-level variables are denoted as missing at the most extreme (top and bottom)
one percent level of the distribution on an annual basis. We also do not use the data
on banks which have gone into administration. Finally, we exclude banks with fewer
than ﬁve years of available data as they are either newly-chartered banks or banks
that have been liquidated. After all screenings our sample size consists of about 2,080
bank-year observations pertaining to 86 banks over the full sample period. Addition-
ally, our dataset contains indicator variables indicating type of bank (state-owned or
foreign-owned), recession years, and parliamentary election years.
Tables 1 and 2 summarize the variables that we examine in our analysis. Table
1 gives the deﬁnitions of variables as well as the basic descriptive statistics for the
entire sample. Most banks are domestic private sector commercial banks. Foreign
banks constitute 22.6 percent of the sample, and state banks represent 21.9 percent of
bank-years. We speciﬁcally examine some of the banks’ ﬁnancial ratios including loan-
to-asset, deposit-to-asset and securities-to-asset ratios. We also investigate the growth
rates of loans, deposits and government securities as well as bank performance measures
such as interest expenditures, interest revenues and the interest margin. Descriptive
6For more detail on the Turkish banking system, see Denizer (2000), Mercan et al. (2003), and
Matousek et al. (2008).
7As of December 2008, available at http://www.tbb.org.tr/english/
8statistics show that banks earn 3.9 percent interest margin (Margint) and lend 28.2
percent of assets (Loant/TAt) over the entire sample. Furthermore, we observe that
banks enjoy positive growth rates (in real terms) of deposits (DepositGrowtht), loans
(LoanGrowtht) and government securities holdings (BondGrowtht).
Table 2 presents the basic descriptive statistics of our variables to give a ﬂavor of
the evolution of our variables over diﬀerent stages of the election cycle. The table
is composed of four panels to provide information on the variables over four diﬀerent
periods in an election cycle. These periods are the year before the election, the election
year, the year after the election, and the year that is non-adjacent to those three years
(the most remote year from the election), which we call the benchmark year. The
data indicate that Turkish banks exhibit a higher mean share of government securities
to assets (0.044) in non-adjacent (benchmark) years. The averages of deposit-to-asset
and loan-to-asset ratios are highest in the benchmark years as well: 0.466 and 0.295,
respectively. Interestingly, Turkish banks decrease their loan growth rate in pre-election
years (-0.012). In line with the growth rate of loans, banks’ loan-to-asset rations are
lowest in pre-election years. The behavior of loan dynamics over election cycles could
be explained by more cautious lending behavior of the bank managers in pre-election
years. Also, compared with the election periods, the growth of government securities
holdings in pre-election years is signiﬁcantly higher, as the government, in need of funds
to ﬁnance pre-election activities, issues attractive securities. To sum up, there is some
evidence that election cycles may have an impact on banks’ behavior.
We next present a visual inspection of the evolution of some of these variables
across bank types, as our aim is to understand the behavior of diﬀerent bank types over
election cycles. In Figure 2 we plot the average loan-to-asset ratio for three types of
banks: domestic commercial, foreign, and state. From 1963–1994, we ﬁnd that state-
owned banks had the lowest lending share with respect to their total assets. However,
as of 1988 the loan-to-asset ratio of state-owned banks starts to increase: after 1998,
to around 0.38. Since then, on average, state banks’ loan-to-asset ratios have been
higher than those of the other type of banks in most years. This is understandable as
state-owned banks played an important role in the development of various industries
9and small businesses starting with the implementation of ﬁnancial restructuring in the
1990s. The 1978–1992 period was also characterized by an increase in the number of
foreign banks with a presence in the Turkish banking sector (see also Figure 1). State
bank lending held steady until the ﬁnancial crises and recession of 2001.
Figure 3 plots the evolution of average deposit-to-asset ratios for each type of bank.
We see that domestic commercial banks have a higher average deposit ratio compared
to their state-owned and foreign counterparts. This is mainly due to the fact that local
commercial banks have extended their branches throughout the country8 and they oﬀer
several services that are competitive with state banks’ oﬀerings. In contrast, foreign-
owned banks’ presence is conﬁned to the largest cities, with a much lower emphasis on
retail banking. Figure 4 depicts the behavior of the average interest margin for all banks.
Notice that there is almost no diﬀerence in the interest margin between local commercial
and foreign banks in the 1960–70s, during which this measure was very low at times
for all banks. This is not surprising. Prior to 1980, bank activity in ﬁnancial markets
was very limited. There was little competition between banks as interest rates were
controlled by the government. Furthermore, the 1973–74 oil crises had quite negative
eﬀects in Turkey. With the implementation of a ﬁnancial reform programme in the
1980s, competition amongst banks became more common. Given their expertise and
knowledge in ﬁnancial markets, foreign-owned banks were able to improve their interest
margin substantially, and their competing domestic commercial banks followed suit. As
expected, state banks’ performance trailed that of private-sector banks.9 The latter
facts are in line with Bonin et al. (2005) who show that foreign banks provide better
service and are more cost-eﬃcient.
While providing interesting insights, the descriptive analysis of these ﬁgures and the
statistics presented in Tables 1–2 alone cannot provide a full account of Turkish banks’
behavior over election cycles, as we cannot control for several confounding factors.
Hence, we subject the data to a rigorous empirical investigation to understand how
diﬀerent bank types’ behavior may have diﬀered over election cycles. In the next section,
8State banks also have a wide presence throughout the country.
9It is this observation that state banks substantially underperform private-sector bank performance
prompt many researchers to advocate privatization programmes.
10we describe the econometric strategy that we employ to investigate the eﬀects of election
cycles on state versus private-sector bank behavior.
4 Empirical Model and Results
As documented in the previous section, Turkish banks’ ﬁnancial ratios and their growth
rates appear to diﬀer around the dates of parliamentary elections. Graphs of some of
these ratios also give the impression of the presence of diﬀerences across bank types.
Some of the cyclical movements visible in Figures 3 and 4 could be due to electoral
cycles. To quantify the presence of diﬀerences between bank types and to determine
whether election cycles have an impact on bank behavior across bank types, we use a
variant of a dynamic empirical speciﬁcation proposed by earlier researchers. The main
diﬀerence in our approach is the introduction of a set of election dummies to capture
diﬀerences in bank behavior over the election cycles, rather than merely focusing on
election years. We also interact these dummies with bank type to observe potential
diﬀerences across bank types. Our model takes the following form:
Yit = α0 + α1Yi,t−1 + Etβ + ζ1Stateit + ζ2Foreignit +
StateitEtξ1 + ForeignitEtξ2 + Zitγ + λt + νi + εit
where i and t denote bank and time indices, respectively and β, ξ1 and ξ2 are vectors of
coeﬃcients on the election timing indicators and their interactions with bank type. Bank
and time ﬁxed eﬀects are captured by νi and λt, respectively, and εit denotes the error
term. In our investigation, we use a set of bank ﬁnance ratios, the growth rates of several
variables and bank performance measures as dependent variables, Yit. These include the
loan-to-asset (Loanit/TAit), deposit-to-asset (Depositit/TAit) and securities-to-asset
(Bondit/TAit) ratios to model the changes in the asset and the liability sides of the
banks’ balance sheet. Next, we investigate several performance measures including the
interest margin (Marginit), interest revenues (IntRevenueit) and interest expenditures
(IntExpendit). We also scrutinize loan growth rates (LoanGrowthit) as well as deposit
and securities growth rates (DepositGrowthit, and BondGrowthit, respectively). To
allow for persistence in the behavior of the dependent variable, reﬂecting continuity
11in banks’ ﬁnancial policies, we include the lagged dependent variable, Yi,t−1 in our
regression model. We control for the eﬀects of other factors, including a vector of bank-
level and country level variables (denoted by Z), as described below. Finally, Stateit
(Foreignit) is an indicator variable which equals one if the bank is state (foreign) owned
at time t and zero otherwise.
The key variables of interest are a set of election dummies, denoted as E, which
include three dichotomous variables: Electiont, Electiont−1, and Electiont+1. The ﬁrst
dummy variable is equal to one if parliamentary elections took place at time t and zero
otherwise. Similarly, years before the elections and after the elections are captured by
Electiont−1 and Electiont+1 dummies, respectively. The coeﬃcients of these variables
allow us to compare the eﬀects of election cycles on the dependent variables of interest.
The interactions of these variables with Stateit and Foreignit allow us to test whether
election cycles’ eﬀects are related to the bank types, as reﬂected in the magnitudes and
signiﬁcance of the ξ1 and ξ2 coeﬃcients.
The elements of vector Z control for bank-speciﬁc and macroeconomic characteristics
that inﬂuence banks’ policies. The choice of our control variables is motivated by earlier
research which investigate bank lending and performance in time series or panel data
settings.10 To control for economies of scale, we include the natural log of real total
assets (log(TAit)). The ﬁnancial strength of a bank is measured by its net worth
normalized by total assets (Equityit/TAt). In addition, we introduce a set of variables
to control for macroeconomic factors that may aﬀect bank behavior such as recession
and coup dummies Recessiont and Coupt, respectively.11
We estimate the model with the one-step system dynamic panel data (DPD) estima-
tor. System DPD combines equations in diﬀerences of the variables with equations in
levels of the variables. In this system GMM approach (see Blundell and Bond (1998)),
lagged levels are used as instruments for diﬀerenced equations and lagged diﬀerences
are used as instruments for level equations. The models are estimated using a ﬁrst
10See for instance Demirg¨ u¸ c-Kunt and Huizinga (1999) or Saunders and Schumacher (2000).
11Throughout the sample period, Turkey experienced recessions in 1979, 1980, 1994, 1999, and 2001
years, while a military coup took place in 1980–1982. Thanks to remittances from Turkish “guest
workers” (gastarbeiters) who began to work in Germany and other European countries in 1961, the
Turkish economy did not experience a downturn in the 1960s or early 1970s.
12diﬀerence transformation to remove the individual ﬁrm eﬀect. The set of instruments
includes from second to fourth lags of levels of bank-speciﬁc variables for diﬀerence
equations, and second lags of diﬀerences of bank-speciﬁc variables for level equations.
Country level characteristics are treated as exogenous.
The reliability of our econometric methodology depends crucially on the validity of
the instruments, which can be evaluated with Sargan’s test of overidentifying restric-
tions, asymptotically distributed as χ2 in the number of restrictions. A rejection of the
null hypothesis that instruments are orthogonal to errors would indicate that the esti-
mates are not consistent. We also present test statistics for ﬁrst-order and second-order
serial correlation in the error process. In a dynamic panel data context, we expect ﬁrst-
order serial correlation, but should not be able to detect second-order serial correlation
if the instruments are appropriately uncorrelated with the errors.
4.1 Empirical ﬁndings
We present our results in three sets of tables. Our ﬁrst set of results considers the
eﬀects of elections on bank ﬁnancial variables. The second table depicts our results on
how growth rates of loans, deposits and bond holdings evolve through election cycles.
The last set of results concentrate on the relationship between election cycles and bank
performance. Our main focus, throughout the discussion, will be on the sign, size and
signiﬁcance of the coeﬃcients associated with the election dummies and their interac-
tions with bank type dummies. For all models discussed in the following subsection,
the Hansen statistic for overidentifying restrictions and the Arellano–Bond AR(2) tests
shows that, at the 5% signiﬁcance level, our instruments are appropriately orthogonal
to the error and no second order serial correlation is detected, respectively. Hence, we
do not make additional comments on those aspects of the estimates.
4.1.1 Bank ﬁnancial ratios
Table 3 evaluates the impact of the election cycle on the loan-to-asset, deposit-to-asset
and securities-to-assets ratio. The ﬁrst column gives the regression results for the loan-
to-asset ratio. In this column we see that the State dummy is negative and signiﬁcant.
13This indicates that state-owned banks have lower loan-to-asset ratios. The election
dummies are negative and more so during the year before the election than in the
election year. One year after the election, the election dummy is also negative, and the
magnitude of its eﬀect is comparable to that of the pre-election period. This implies
that banks reduce their loan-to-asset ratios during and around the election year which
may be due to a perception of an increased risk to lending. When we consider whether
banks’ behavior over the election cycle diﬀer from one another, data reveal that there
is no diﬀerence in the behavior of loan-to-asset ratios across bank types over the cycle.
During the post-election year, foreign banks’ ratios increase slightly in comparison to
those of state banks and domestic private-sector banks, which can be explained by
the desire of foreign banks to expand operations after the elections. However, neither
the size nor the signiﬁcance level of the relevant coeﬃcient is high enough to imply a
signiﬁcant divergence across bank types.
The lack of diﬀerences in the loan-to-asset ratio across bank types over the election
cycle is an interesting ﬁnding due to the fact that the banking literature generally has
claimed that state bank loans grow more than those of other bank types, suggesting
the existence of politically motivated lending. Although our results consider the level
of the loan-to-asset ratio rather than its growth, we ﬁnd that state banks’ ratios do not
diﬀer from those of domestic commercial or foreign-owned banks. This is an interesting
observation which we will come back when we investigate the behavior of loan growth
over the election cycle. Finally, the coeﬃcient of the Recession dummy is negative as
one would expect, signaling that during downturns bank loans decline.
The next column presents results for the deposit-to-asset ratio. We ﬁnd that foreign
banks’ ratios are lower than those of state banks and domestic private-sector banks, but
not signiﬁcantly so. Next we investigate the interaction coeﬃcients to see whether the
ratio diﬀers across bank types over the election cycle. However, no signiﬁcant diﬀerences
are found between domestic private-sector, foreign-owned and state-owned banks’ ratios.
While banks’ deposit-to-asset ratio does not change in the year before the election and
the election year, this ratio increases a year after the election year. Although we do not
have the data to further our claim, it seems that the public put their savings in other
14instruments such as foreign currencies or gold, both of which are traditional savings
instruments in Turkey, in the period prior to and during the election year. This claim
can be rationalized by savers’ desire to lessen the impact of potential economic volatility
due to uncertainties about the elected governments’ economic programme. The impact
of election cycles on the deposit-to–asset ratio also seems to be similar across bank
types. The only diﬀerence is that the increase in the deposit ratio is signiﬁcantly
smaller for state-owned banks in the year after the election. Finally, the Coup dummy
is insigniﬁcant indicating that bank deposits are not necessarily aﬀected by these events.
The coeﬃcient of the Recession dummy is positive signalling that the public deposit
their savings in safe havens during recessions.
The last column considers the behavior of the bond-to-asset ratio over the election
cycle. State banks’ ratio exceeds that of the other types of banks. The ratio does not
diﬀer signiﬁcantly between domestic and foreign-owned private-sector banks. During
the pre-election year banks seem to increase their government bond holdings, but we
ﬁnd no diﬀerence between domestic private-sector and state banks over any point in
the election cycle. However, the bond-to-asset ratios of foreign-owned banks increases
during the post-election year. Finally, we see that banks reduced their bond-to-asset
ratio during the coup years, when banks were ﬁrst allowed to broaden their asset holdings
during ﬁnancial liberalization, and increased it during the recessionary episodes.
4.1.2 Growth in loans, deposits and bond holdings
We next investigate how the growth rates of loans, deposits and bond holdings evolve
around the parliamentary election years. The literature concentrates on loan growth
regressions to compare the diﬀerences in lending behavior of state versus private-sector
banks across election and nonelection years. The ﬁrst column of Table 4 shows that
loan growth is lower for state banks. We do not detect any diﬀerences in loan growth
rates between private-sector domestic and foreign owned banks. Yet, a year before the
election, the loan growth rate declines for all banks. This decline is further observed
for foreign banks during the election year. However, state-owned banks and domestic
private sector banks do not alter their loan growth rate over the election cycles. In par-
15ticular, state-owned banks do not systematically increase their lending during elections
in comparison to other banks in the ﬁnancial system. This result is in sharp contrast
to that of Din¸ c (2005) who shows that state banks increase their loans during election
years and claim that political motivations inﬂuence this behavior.
Given that Din¸ c’s results are based on cross-country panel regression, it is possible
that some inﬂuential outliers or the presence of accounting diﬀerences in reporting across
countries may have played a role in those ﬁndings. It is also possible that his results
are driven by the banks included in the regressions.12 Equally, the time period during
which he studied the phenomena may have an impact on his ﬁndings. In our case,
by concentrating on a single country, we can clearly observe that Turkish state-owned
banks do not change their lending behavior vis-` a-vis that of private-sector banks. As
expected we ﬁnd that during recessionary episodes loan growth was reduced and during
the period of military rule it increased substantially as discussed above.
Column two of the same table provides regression results for the deposit growth rate.
We see that the growth rate of state- and foreign-owned banks does not diﬀer from that
of domestic commercial banks. Deposit growth rates a year after elections are higher
for all banks. However, our regression model does not point out to any diﬀerences in
the deposit growth rate across diﬀerent bank types over election cycles.
The third column of Table 4 depicts our ﬁndings for the bond growth rate. While
foreign banks’ bond growth rate is slower than that of domestic banks, we ﬁnd no
diﬀerence between local private and state bank bond growth rates. During the election
years all banks seem to decrease their holding of government bonds. However, the bond
growth rate of foreign-owned banks declines during the pre-election and increses in the
post-election year. The reduction of growth of bond holdings during the pre-election
period can be rationalized as the desire to reduce exposure to government debt.
12Although the panel data Din¸ c uses includes a large number of countries, it does not necessarily
cover all banks that play an important role in each country.
164.1.3 Bank performance indicators
Table 5 presents the eﬀects of elections on interest rate margin and its two components:
interest revenue and interest expense ratios. The ﬁrst column of the table presents
our results for the interest margin. We can observe that the coeﬃcient associated with
state-owned banks is negative. This implies that the state banks’ interest rate margin
is the lowest. In fact the literature has pointed out the ineﬃciencies of state banks
and recommended privatization of state banks. Inspecting the eﬀect of elections on
banks, we do not see signiﬁcant diﬀerences across diﬀerent election stages, as none of
the coeﬃcients are statistically signiﬁcant. We also see little diﬀerence across bank
types over election cycles, except that a year after the election foreign banks’ margin is
signiﬁcantly higher than that of the local commercial and state-owned banks. This is
another testament to the relative eﬃciency (ineﬃciency) of foreign-owned (state-owned)
banks.
Column two of the table presents the behavior of the interest revenue-to-asset ratio.
As in the case of interest margin, state-owned banks’ interest revenue ratios are lower
than those of domestic private-sector or foreign banks. In the year of the election,
interest revenues fall for all banks. We also ﬁnd some diﬀerences across the category
of banks’ interest revenues over election cycles. For instance, foreign banks have lower
interest revenues in the pre-election year, which might be explained by a decrease in
lending activities. Finally, column three depicts the impact of election cycles on the
interest expense-to-asset ratio of the banks. Interestingly, we ﬁnd that the interest
expenses of all three groups of banks are similar. Given this ﬁnding, it is evident that
the state banks’ interest margin is lowest among all bank types due to the fact that
their interest revenues are very low. It is likely to be the case that state banks are
allowed to lend at a loss to potential borrowers. When we try to examine whether
there are any diﬀerences across banks over the election cycles, we see only one instance
of diﬀering behavior: foreign bank interest expenses are lower than those of the other
types of banks during the post-election year.
For all three sets of regressions, we observe that the coeﬃcient of the Recession
17dummy is always positive and the Coup dummy is insigniﬁcant except for the ﬁrst
model. These results are intuitive and we do not elaborate further.
4.2 Robustness Checks
We extend our analysis by examining whether our key results are robust to changes in
instrument set and sub-periods. As explained in Section 3, our set of instruments in-
cludes the second and third lags of levels of bank-speciﬁc variables (including ownership)
for diﬀerence equations, and the second and fourth lags of diﬀerences of bank-speciﬁc
variables for level equations. We also experimented with instrument sets which include
up to six lags of bank-dependent variables in both level and diﬀerence equations, but
this did not aﬀect our main results.
Furthermore, we checked the consistency of our results by concentrating on the
1980–2005 period. These 25 years include the 1980–1982 coup period, during which the
military was in control of the country, as well as a substantial increase in the number
of foreign banks and the ﬁnancial crisis of 2002. Our results for this period are similar
to those reported in Tables 3–5 and are not reported for the sake of brevity.13
5 Conclusions
The recent literature has investigated state versus private-sector banks’ lending activ-
ities to scrutinize the impact of elections on banks’ behavior. This paper extends the
question and asks if bank behavior changes meaningfully over the full election cycle,
rather than focusing on election versus non-election years. If so, is there a diﬀerence
between state-owned versus private-sector (domestically or foreign owned) banks’ reac-
tions to election cycles? In our investigation we speciﬁcally concentrate on several bank
ﬁnancial ratios and performance measures. To carry out our analysis, we utilize a bank
panel data collected from Turkey over 1963–2005 including all banks in the ﬁnancial
sector.
The key variables of interest are a set of election dummies, which capture the eﬀects
of the election year and pre- and post-election years on bank behavior. Inspecting the
13These estimates are available upon request.
18coeﬃcients of election dummies as well as the interaction between election and bank type
dummies, we investigate the impact of election cycles on banks and test for diﬀerences
across diﬀerent type of banks. A simple model is constructed to capture the eﬀects
of election cycles on banks’ loan, deposit and bond-to-asset ratios, the growth rates of
these variables, and the changes in bank performance indicators in relation to election
cycles.
Our results can be summarized as follows. We observe that election cycles signif-
icantly aﬀect bank behavior. However, we do not ﬁnd conclusive evidence that bank
behavior diﬀers across bank types as claimed in earlier research. In particular, we ﬁnd
no evidence that state-owned banks change their lending activities in comparison to
other bank categories before, during or after elections. This is an interesting result
on its own as several country-speciﬁc studies have found that state-owned banks be-
have diﬀerently during elections. Furthermore, we detect no eﬀect of election cycles on
deposit-to-asset and bond-to-asset ratios or their growth rates across banks.
The second set of results that we gather from our study points out that state-owned
banks are less eﬃcient than both domestic and foreign-owned private-sector banks.
Although our regression results point out that the state bank interest expense ratio is
lower than that of both domestic and foreign private-sector banks, the interest revenue
ratios of state banks are the lowest among all bank categories. Given this ﬁnding,
one may be tempted to recommend privatization of state banks as Clarke et al. (2005)
suggest. However, while world ﬁnancial markets go through hardships that have not
been experienced since the great depression and while many private enterprises are
nationalized throughout the world, privatization of state banks is not something that
one would recommend at this time.14 Yet it is advisable that state banks should operate
in a more transparent mode so as not to be subject to accusations or criticism related
to funds being channeled towards projects that beneﬁt the governments or those related
to government oﬃcials.
Although we arrive at similar conclusions to earlier research on the relative ineﬃ-
14We must note that, over the last 50 years, several state banks in Turkey were privatized with the
premise that funds will be allocated to potential investors much eﬀectively and eﬃciently. Those state
banks that currently operate in Turkey fulﬁll speciﬁc roles that are not satisﬁed by private-sector banks.
19ciency of state-owned banks, one may ask why our results diﬀer regarding the behavior
of state-owned banks over electoral cycles. There are a few possible reasons. First, our
empirical model diﬀers from those proposed in earlier research as we consider whether
electoral cycles aﬀect bank behavior rather than the narrower question of whether bank
behavior diﬀers between election and non-election years. Second, earlier research that
uses panel data has employed a smaller subset of country-speciﬁc bank data. If many
banks are omitted from the analysis, this can lead to misleading results as the data suf-
fer from sample selection bias. The possibility of accounting diﬀerences across countries
may be another potential problem leading to biased results. Alternatively, in Turkey,
while state-owned banks are prone to common problems of ineﬃciency, they may not
be receiving directives from the government to channel more funds into the economy
during election cycles as may be more common in other developing countries. Given our
evidence on the behavior of state-owned banks versus private-sector banks in Turkey,
we think that a more detailed analysis would be useful to evaluate the impact of election
cycles on bank lending in other developed or developing economies.
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Figure 4: Dynamics of Interest Margin
24Table 1: Descriptive statistics: Turkish banks, 1963–2005.
Deﬁnition µ σ N
Depositt/TAt deposits over total assets 0.456 0.282 2,077
Loant/TAt loans over total assets 0.282 0.179 1,988
Bondt/TAt government securities over total assets 0.039 0.066 2,076
Margint interest margin over total assets 0.039 0.060 1,941
IntExpt/TAt interest expenditures over total assets 0.048 0.049 1,941
IntRevt/TAt interest revenues over total assets 0.084 0.058 2,077
DepositGrowtht deposits growth 0.139 0.536 1,755
LoanGrowtht loan growth 0.112 0.916 1,893
BondGrowtht governement securities growth 0.109 1.456 1,779
Equityt/TAt net worth over total assets 0.169 0.183 2,077
log(TAt) log of total assets 14.159 2.333 2,077
Statet one if state banks and zero otherwise 0.219 0.414 2,080
Foreignt one if foreign bank and zero otherwise 0.226 0.419 2,080
Electiont one if election year and zero otherwise 0.235 0.424 2,080
Recessiont one if recession year and zero otherwise 0.119 0.324 2,080
Coupt one if coup 1980-1982 and zero otherwise 0.061 0.239 2,080
Note: N is the number of bank-years, while µ and σ represent mean and standard deviation respectively.
25Table 2: Descriptive statistics: Bank variables over election cycles.
Pre-Election Year Election Year
µ σ N µ σ N
Depositt/TAt 0.456 0.281 470 0.461 0.277 487
Loant/TAt 0.272 0.176 453 0.279 0.178 468
Bondt/TAt 0.040 0.070 470 0.038 0.069 487
Margint 0.036 0.059 442 0.035 0.060 456
IntExpt/TAt 0.047 0.050 442 0.047 0.049 456
IntRevt/TAt 0.081 0.059 470 0.081 0.056 487
DepositGrowtht 0.038 0.486 414 0.176 0.501 428
LoanGrowtht -0.012 0.902 449 0.127 0.911 459
BondGrowtht 0.171 1.463 429 -0.037 1.466 428
Equityt/TAt 0.157 0.165 470 0.162 0.176 487
log(TAt) 14.268 2.312 470 14.239 2.323 487
Statet 0.211 0.408 470 0.217 0.413 488
Foreignt 0.232 0.423 470 0.230 0.421 488
Post-Election Year Benchmark Year
µ σ N µ σ N
Depositt/TAt 0.456 0.282 482 0.466 0.283 506
Loant/TAt 0.287 0.181 460 0.295 0.176 487
Bondt/TAt 0.038 0.060 482 0.044 0.071 506
Margint 0.046 0.069 445 0.040 0.051 475
IntExpt/TAt 0.052 0.051 445 0.050 0.049 475
IntRevt/TAt 0.094 0.064 482 0.087 0.055 506
DepositGrowtht 0.231 0.618 413 0.116 0.509 452
LoanGrowtht 0.088 0.923 444 0.239 0.937 481
BondGrowtht 0.219 1.482 408 0.072 1.360 455
Equityt/TAt 0.173 0.182 482 0.153 0.174 506
log(TAt) 14.108 2.333 482 14.205 2.267 506
Statet 0.222 0.416 482 0.239 0.427 506
Foreignt 0.228 0.420 482 0.208 0.406 506
Note: N is the number of bank-years, while µ and σ represent mean and standard deviation respectively.
See notes to Table 1 for variables’ deﬁnitions.Table 3: Models of Loan/TA, Deposit/TA and Bond/TA, 1963–2005.
Loant/TAt Depositt/TAt Bondt/TAt
Equityt/TAt -0.051* -0.136*** -0.057***
(0.030) (0.044) (0.016)
log(TA)t 0.003 -0.005 -0.005***
(0.003) (0.004) (0.001)
Recessiont -0.042*** 0.028*** 0.008***
(0.011) (0.007) (0.003)
Coupt 0.000 -0.013 -0.026***
(0.013) (0.011) (0.005)
Statet -0.038*** -0.019 0.013*
(0.014) (0.026) (0.007)
Foreignt -0.013 -0.049 -0.006
(0.014) (0.035) (0.009)
Electiont−1 -0.030*** 0.009 0.005*
(0.007) (0.007) (0.003)
Electiont -0.014* 0.010 0.001
(0.008) (0.009) (0.003)
Electiont+1 -0.030*** 0.033*** 0.002
(0.008) (0.007) (0.003)
Electiont−1 × Statet 0.014 -0.008 -0.005
(0.012) (0.009) (0.005)
Electiont × Statet -0.015 -0.014 0.000
(0.013) (0.011) (0.005)
Electiont+1 × Statet 0.024 -0.021** -0.003
(0.015) (0.009) (0.004)
Electiont−1 × Foreignt -0.018 -0.026 -0.006
(0.019) (0.020) (0.007)
Electiont × Foreignt -0.020 -0.004 0.000
(0.016) (0.024) (0.011)








Bank-years 1,801 1,893 1,892
Banks 84 86 86
Hansen p-val 1.000 1.000 1.000
Hansen d.f. 470 364 364
AR(2) p-val 0.076 0.387 0.343
Notes: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Variable deﬁnitions are given in Table 1. The constant
term is not reported. Instruments include 2-4 lags of bank variables for diﬀerence equations and two
lags for level equations.Table 4: Models of GrowthLoan, GrowthDeposit and GrowthBond, 1963–2005.
GrowthLoant GrowthDepositt GrowthBondt
Equityt/TAt 0.236 -0.743* -0.965*
(0.649) (0.380) (0.508)
log(TA)t -0.038 0.019 -0.091
(0.041) (0.014) (0.068)
Recessiont -0.369*** -0.016 0.267**
(0.091) (0.046) (0.107)
Coupt 0.306** 0.091* -0.719***
(0.133) (0.051) (0.112)
Statet -0.613** -0.111 -0.065
(0.304) (0.073) (0.287)
Foreignt -0.401 0.005 -0.605*
(0.278) (0.142) (0.331)
Electiont−1 -0.170*** 0.007 0.182
(0.045) (0.031) (0.129)
Electiont 0.008 0.102** -0.319**
(0.067) (0.041) (0.131)
Electiont+1 -0.073 0.144*** -0.154
(0.072) (0.046) (0.161)
Electiont−1 × Statet 0.052 -0.031 -0.232
(0.112) (0.054) (0.210)
Electiont × Statet -0.111 -0.034 0.350*
(0.142) (0.057) (0.207)
Electiont+1 × Statet 0.150 0.051 0.304
(0.142) (0.077) (0.263)
Electiont−1 × Foreignt -0.243 -0.181 -0.419*
(0.176) (0.120) (0.238)
Electiont × Foreignt -0.297** -0.010 0.047
(0.141) (0.099) (0.222)








Bank-years 1,710 1,600 1,594
Banks 84 74 81
Hansen p-val 1.000 1.000 1.000
Hansen d.f. 347 344 347
AR(2) p-val 0.654 0.371 0.122
Notes: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Variable deﬁnitions are given in Table 1. The constant
term is not reported. Instruments include 2-4 lags of bank variables for diﬀerence equations and two
lags for level equations.Table 5: Models of Margin, IntRevenue/TA and IntExpenditure/TA, 1963–2005.
Margint IntRevenuet/TAt IntExpendituret/TAt
Equityt/TAt 0.013 0.034** 0.031**
(0.020) (0.017) (0.013)
log(TA)t 0.002 0.003** 0.002*
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
Recessiont 0.001 0.005 0.008***
(0.005) (0.003) (0.002)
Coupt -0.002 0.015*** 0.018***
(0.003) (0.004) (0.004)
Statet -0.029*** -0.026*** -0.004
(0.011) (0.007) (0.006)
Foreignt -0.001 -0.008 -0.000
(0.009) (0.008) (0.008)
Electiont−1 -0.002 -0.001 0.004**
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
Electiont -0.006 -0.015*** -0.006**
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Electiont+1 -0.004 0.004 0.007***
(0.003) (0.004) (0.002)
Electiont−1 × Statet -0.001 0.000 0.001
(0.005) (0.004) (0.003)
Electiont × Statet 0.001 0.008* 0.006
(0.006) (0.004) (0.004)
Electiont+1 × Statet -0.001 -0.006 -0.005
(0.005) (0.006) (0.004)
Electiont−1 × Foreignt -0.011 -0.011** -0.007
(0.008) (0.004) (0.004)
Electiont × Foreignt -0.003 0.002 0.002
(0.007) (0.005) (0.005)








Bank-years 1,733 1,893 1,733
Banks 85 86 85
Hansen p-val 1.000 1.000 1.000
Hansen d.f. 354 364 354
AR(2) p-val 0.278 0.405 0.070
Notes: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Variable deﬁnitions are given in Table 1. The constant
term is not reported. Instruments include 2-4 lags of bank variables for diﬀerence equations and two
lags for level equations.